Kipp Cabaness v. Brent Thomas, Clifford C. Michaelis, Bountiful City : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2008
Kipp Cabaness v. Brent Thomas, Clifford C.
Michaelis, Bountiful City : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Craig L. Taylor; Willis F. McComas; Hal Armstrong; Bryan D. Nielsen; Craig L. Taylor and
Associates; Attorneys for Appellant.
Stanley J. Preston; Maralyn M. Reger; Bryan M. Scott; Snow, Christensen and Martineau; Russell L.
Mahan; Bountiful City Attorney; Attorneys for Appellees.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Cabaness v. Thomas, No. 20080446 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/932
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
KIPP CABANESS, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
vs. 
BRENT THOMAS, CLIFFORD C. 
MICHAELIS, and BOUNTIFUL CITY, 
Defendants/ Appellees. 
Case No. 20080446-SC 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
Appeal from the Second Judicial District Court, Davis County, State of Utah 
The Honorable Glen R. Dawson, District Judge 
Civil No. 040700494 
CRAIG L. TAYLOR 
WILLIS F. MCCOMAS 
HAL ARMSTRONG 
BRYAN D. NIELSEN 
CRAIG L. TAYLOR & 
ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
472 North Main Street 
Kaysville, Utah 84037 
Attorneys for Appellant Kipp Cabaness 
STANLEY J. PRESTON (4119) 
MARALYN M. REGER (8468) 
BRYAN M.SCOTT (9381) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
RUSSELL L. MAHAN (2059) 
BOUNTIFUL CITY ATTORNEY 
790 South 100 East 
Bountiful Utah 84010 
Attorneys for Appellees Bountiful City, Brent 
Thomas and Clifford C. Michaelis 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
KIPP CABANESS, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
vs. 
BRENT THOMAS, CLIFFORD C. 
MICHAELIS, and BOUNTIFUL CITY, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Case No. 20080446-SC 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
Appeal from the Second Judicial District Court, Davis County, State of Utah 
The Honorable Glen R. Dawson, District Judge 
Civil No. 040700494 
CRAIG L. TAYLOR 
WILLIS F. MCCOMAS 
HAL ARMSTRONG 
BRYAN D. NIELSEN 
CRAIG L. TAYLOR & 
ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
472 North Main Street 
Kaysville, Utah 84037 
Attorneys for Appellant Kipp Cabaness 
STANLEY J. PRESTON (4119) 
MARALYN M. REGER (8468) 
BRYAN M. SCOTT (9381) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
RUSSELL L. MAHAN (2059) 
BOUNTIFUL CITY ATTORNEY 
790 South 100 East 
Bountiful Utah 84010 
Attorneys for Appellees Bountiful City, Brent 
Thomas and Clifford C. Michaelis 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
III. DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 2 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND 
DISPOSITION BELOW 2 
B. RESPONSE TO CABANESS' STATEMENT OF FACTS 4 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 24 
VI. ARGUMENT 25 
A. THE SUBJECT POLICIES OF THE MANUAL DO NOT CREATE 
AN IMPLIED CONTRACT 25 
1. The Relevant Personnel Policies Are Warnings To Employees, 
And Do Not Create Any Contractual Obligations 26 
2. Cabaness' Unilateral Expectations Are Insufficient To Create An 
Implied Contract 27 
3. The Trial Court Properly Excluded The Improper And Untimely 
Affidavits Of Mears and Quinn 28 
4. The Utah Cases Cited by Cabaness Are Distinguishable 30 
5. Cabaness Misstates The Record Below 31 
B. THE IMMUNITY ACT BARS CABANESS' CONTRACT CLAIMS . . . . 34 
C. DAMAGES FOR MENTAL DISTRESS ARE NOT RECOVERABLE 
UNDER CABANESS' CONTRACT CLAIMS 38 
D. CABANESS' WRONGFUL CONSTRUCTIVE TERMINATION 
CLAIM FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW 39 
i 
E. THE INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
CLAIM AGAINST THOMAS AND MICHAELIS IS WITHOUT 
MERIT 41 
1. Cabaness Cannot Rely On Evidence Of Incidents That Occurred 
When He Was Not Present, Nor On Incidents That Allegedly 
Occurred Prior To March 31, 2000 41 
2. Dr. Hawk's Untimely Report And Affidavit Were Properly 
Excluded 43 
3. The Relevant Actions Of Thomas Or MichaeHs Do Not Give Rise 
To A Claim For Intentional Infliction Of Emotional Distress 44 
VII. CONCLUSION 49 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Page 
Americans Disabled for Accessible Public Transp. v. SkyWest Airlines, Inc., 762 F.Supp. 320 
(D. Utah 1990) 38 
Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 29 
Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, 116 P.3d 323 45 
Atiya v. Salt Lake County, 852 P.2d 1007 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 34 
Barson v. E.K Squibb <& Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984) 29 
Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985) 38 
Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook <&McDonough, 2003 UT 9, 70 P.3d 17, 30 45 
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., Ill P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989) 30 
Boisjoly v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 795, 802 (D. Utah 1988) 48 
Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49 (Utah 1991) 30, 31 
Broadbentv. Board of Educ. of Cache County Sch. Dist., 910 P.2d 1274 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) . . 40 
Butler, Crockett <& Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 2005 UT App 402 36 
Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon <& Davis Utah, Inc., Ill P.2d 483 (Utah 1989) 32, 33, 40 
Calliari v. Sugar, 435 A.2d 139 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1980) 43 
Canfield v. Layton City, 2005 UT 60, 122 P.3D 622 31 
Capital Assets Fin. Serv. v. Lindsay, 956 P.2d 1090 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 6 
Croft by Croft v. Wicker, 131 P.2d 789 (Alaska 1987) 43 
Demasse v. ITT Corp., 984 P.2d 1138 (Ariz. 1999) 31 
Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52 (Utah 1998) 38 
Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-D ay Saints, 2001 UT 25, 21 P.3d 198 45 
iii 
Gaily v. Columbia University, 22 F.Supp.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 31 
GNSPartnership v. Fullmer, 873 P.2d 1157 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 6 
Hansen v. America Online, 2004 UT 62, 96 P.3d 950 39, 40 
Hatch v. Davis, 2006 UT 44,147 P.3d 383 42, 43 
Hatch v. Davis, 2004 UT App 378,102 P.3d 774 41, 42 
Heideman v. Washington City, 2007 UT App 11, 155 P.3d 900 33 
H.L.O. v. Hossle, 381 N.W.2d 641 (Iowa 1986) 43 
Hodges v. Gibson Prods. Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991) 40 
In the Matter of the General Determination of Rights, 982 P.2d 65 (Utah 1999) 6 
Kornegay v. Mundy, 379 S.E.2d 14 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) 46 
Koulis v. Standard Oil, 746 P.2d 1182 (Utah App. Ct. 1987) 4 
Larson v. SYSCO Corp., 767 P.2d 557, 561 (Utah 1989) 45 
Ledfors p. Emery County Sch. Dist, 849 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1993) 35, 36 
Litton v. Maverick Paper Co., 388 F.Supp.2d 1261 (D.Kan. 2005) 31 
Lundv. Caple, 675 P.2d 226 (Wash. 1984) 43 
Machan v. UNUM Life Insurance Company of America, 2005 UT 37,1f 16,116 P.3d 342 . . 38, 39 
Manning v. Cigna Corp., 807 F.Supp. 889 (D. Conn. 1991) 32 
Mastic Tile Division ofRuberoid Co. v. Acme Distributing Co., 389 P.2d 56 (Utah 1964) 33 
Millerv. Cook, 273 N.W.2d 567 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) 43 
National Farmers Union Property <& Cas. Co. v. Western Cas. <& Sur. Co., 577 P.2d 961 
(Utah 1978) 35 
Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983) 6 
Pants v. Mission Hills Bank, N.A., 60 F.3d 1486 (10th Ck. 1995) 27 
iv 
Peralta v. Cendant Corp., 123 F.Supp.2d 65 (D. Conn. 2000) 27 
Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992) 40 
ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 29 
KD. v. W.H., 875 P.2d 26 (Wyo. 1994) 43 
Rutherford v. AT&T Comms., 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992) 40 
Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc. 972 P.2d 395, 401 (Utah 1998) 33 
Sanderson v. First Sec. Leasing Co., 844 P.2d 303 (Utah 1992) 33 
Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 735 F. Supp. 381 (D. Utah 1990) 34 
Schurk v. Christensen, 497 P.2d 937 (Wash. 1972) 43 
State of Utah v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2002 UT 75, 52 P.3d 1257 34 
Taylor in re Taylor v. Ogden City Sch. Dist., 927 P.2d 159 (Utah 1996) 35 
Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 1985) 6 
Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985) 6 
Wood v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 2001 UT App 35,19 P.3d 392 27, 28 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 (2003) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (2003) 1, 2, 34, 35, 36 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 (1996) 2, 6, 41 
Utah Code Ann.§78B-2-309) 6 
RULES 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56 2, 6 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59 2, 3, 4,10, 28,29, 45 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 60 2, 3, 10, 28 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Samuel WilHston, 24 Williston on Contracts § 64:7 (4th ed. 1990) 38 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46, comment d (1965) 45, 46 
vi 
I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in this Court is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(j). 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
In his brief, Plaintiff/Appellant Kipp Cabaness ("Cabaness") frames seven appeal 
issues in an argumentative manner that assumes their conclusion. Defendants/Appellees 
Bountiful City (the "City"), Brent Thomas ("Thomas"), and Clifford C. Michaelis 
("Michaelis") (collectively "appellees") restate the issues on appeal as follows: 
1. Issue: Do Cabaness' contractual claims for breach of an implied contract, and 
for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fail because there is no 
implied contract based on the following: (a) the relevant provisions of the Bountiful City 
Personnel Policies & Procedures Manual1 (the "Manual"), which state the City's goals and 
policies and warn employees not to engage in certain misconduct, do not create a contractual 
obligation on the part of the City to insure that no such conduct will occur in the workplace; 
(b) Cabaness failed to meet his burden of coming forward with sufficient admissible evidence 
of an implied contract; (c) Cabaness cannot rely on the untimely Affidavits of Kenneth 
Mears and Bonnie Quinn, because they do not constitute "new evidence"; and/or (d) 
Cabaness' claims are not supported by case law? 
2. Issue: Are Cabaness' purported contractual claims also barred by former 
Section 63-30-10(2) of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1, et 
seq (the "Immunity Act"), because they are based on an injury that arises out of the alleged 
jAs part of his Appendix, Cabaness attaches the Manual dated January 1, 2004, which 
was issued the same month that Cabaness resigned his employment. The relevant Manual is 
the one dated November 5, 1997. (R. 1565-1613). 
1 
infliction of mental anguish? 
3. Issue: Can Cabaness recover emotional distress damages under his contract 
claims? 
4. Issue: Does Cabaness' claim for wrongful constructive termination, which is 
clearly pled as a tort claim, fail because it is not based on the contravention of a clear and 
substantial public policy; and/or because it is barred by the Immunity Act? 
5. Issue: In determining whether Cabaness provided sufficient evidence to 
establish his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, can he rely on evidence of: (a) 
incidents where he was not present; (b) incidents that allegedly occurred prior to March 31, 
2000, pursuant to the four-year statute of limitations; (c) inadmissible evidence; and/or (d) 
the untimely Report and Affidavit of Dr. Hawks, which the trial court excluded? 
6. Issue: Based on the applicable legal standard, do the actions of Thomas or 
Michaelis give rise to a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress? 
III. DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (2003) 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 (1996) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56, 59, 60 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF T H E CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, A N D 
DISPOSITION BELOW. 
Cabaness, a long-time City employee, resigned his employment in January 2004. He 
served his Notice of Claim on March 31, 2004. (R. 6 at If 20). On September 23, 2004, 
Cabaness filed the underlying lawsuit, wherein he alleged various contract and tort claims 
2 
against appellees based on his assertion that he had been constructively terminated as a result 
of the harassment of Thomas, his supervisor, which caused him to suffer severe emotional 
distress. After discovery, appellees filed a summary judgment motion, in response to which, 
Cabaness filed a 106 page opposing memorandum, multiple affidavits, and a cross-motion 
for summary judgment. Appellees moved to strike Cabaness' lengthy memorandum and 
affidavits. After holding three separate hearings on the motions over a three-week period, 
the trial court entered its January 11, 2007 Order and its January 10, 2007 Memorandum 
Decision, wherein it denied appellees' motion to strike (though it stated that much of 
Cabaness' evidence failed to satisfy the authenticity and admissibility requirements of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence), granted appellees' summary judgment motion, and denied 
Cabaness' cross-motion for summary judgment. 
On January 26, 2008, Cabaness filed a Rule 59 and 60(b) Motion to Alter or Amend 
the Court's Final Order ("Rule 59 Motion") together with a 46 page memorandum, the 
Affidavit of Willis McComas, one of his attorneys, to which were attached as exhibits the 
Affidavit and Report of Dr. Hawks. By stipulation of the parties, Cabaness withdrew his 
original memorandum and the McComas Affidavit and, in their place, filed a shorter 
memorandum and the Affidavit of Matthew Hilton, another one of Cabaness' attorneys, to 
which were attached as exhibits both the Mears and Quinn Affidavits, but not the Hawks 
Affidavit and Report. 
In response, appellees moved to strike the Quinn and Mears Affidavits and certain 
portions of the Hilton Affidavit, and later objected to the Hawks Affidavit and Report. The 
trial court's April 23, 2008 Order denied Cabaness' Rule 59 Motion, granted appellees' 
motion to strike, and ruled that the Hawks Affidavit and Report should be disregarded, while 
3 
noting that, even if it had considered the Quinn and Mears Affidavits and the Hawks 
Affidavit and Report, its ruling would not have changed. Cabaness timely filed this appeal, 
which addresses some, but not all, of his dismissed claims.2 
B. RESPONSE TO CABANESS5 STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
Appellees submit that Cabaness' Brief, and particularly his Statement of Facts therein, 
are improper and should be largely disregarded because they fail to satisfy the Koulis v. 
Standard Oil, 746 P.2d 1182 (Utah App. Ct. 1987), standard that a brief must be concise, 
presented with accuracy, and free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous 
matters.3 Cabaness' fact statement is filled with inaccurate and distorted assertions that are 
not supported by the record he cites, based on inadmissible evidence and/or irrelevant and 
immaterial to the issues on appeal. It is also peppered with legal argument and many 
statements which are conclusory and speculative.4 Appellees respond to these facts, and 
clarify the record, as follows: 
1-3. Undisputed for purposes of this appeal. In addition, Thomas was hired by the 
City as a groundman in August 1971. (R. 1411 at 14:11-13). During his employment with 
the City, Thomas has worked as a groundman, apprentice, journeyman, foreman and the 
2Among other things, Cabaness does not appeal the dismissal of his claims against the 
City for negligent infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages, or any contract 
claims to the extent they were alleged against the individual defendants. 
3Briefs which do not comply with the Koulis standard may be disregarded or stricken 
sua sponte by the Court, with an assessment: of attorney's fees. Id. at 1185. 
''These problems are consistent with the overzealous manner in which Cabaness has 
litigated this case, including the filing of lengthy memoranda and 18 separate attorney 
affidavits, that are conclusory and filled with improper argument and hearsay, and his 
attorneys' improper actions in depositions, which led the court to find that Cabaness' 
attorneys had engaged in inappropriate and unprofessional conduct. (R. 1346). 
4 
Superintendent of Operations in the City's Power Department. (R. 1411 at 14:11-13; 1417 at 
37:7-13; 1418 at 41:6-9; 1420 at 49:15-16, 51:11-13). 
4. Inaccurate. The relevant Manual provisions state policies and procedures, but 
do not make "promises." (R. 1570, 1590-1593, 1604; generally R. 1565-1613). 
5. Inaccurate. The Manual makes no representation as to whether it creates a 
contract. It does expressly state, however, that "the policies and procedures in this manual 
may be unilaterally added to, rescinded, or modified from time to time as may be decided by 
the Bountiful City Council," and, "No contract exists between Bountiful City and its 
employees with respect to salary, salary ranges, movement within salary ranges or employee 
benefits." (R. 1570 at § 101(a) and (b)). 
6. Inaccurate. Cabaness' Affidavit does not state that he believed the City had an 
"obligation" to comply with the Manual's provisions, or that he believed that Michaelis was 
responsible to implement the Manual. (R. 1381). Rather, he stated that he had an 
"expectation" that the City would comply with the Manual's provisions. (R. 1381 at f 10). 
He also improperly asserts a legal conclusion that he considered certain Manual policies to be 
an implied agreement. (R. 1381 at j^ 10). Michaelis did not testify that he was responsible to 
implement the Manual, nor did he refer to statements in the Manual regarding harassment as 
"promises." (R. 1861). Rather, in response to a question as to whether it was his 
responsibility to enforce City policy with respect to harassment, Michaelis testified "the buck 
stops with me. You're asking a very broad question that has a legal implication and I don't 
know that I know that" (R. 1861 at 98:20-99:9). The Manual also contains other relevant 
policies regarding "Grievance Procedures" (Section 424), "Sexual and Other Harassment" 
(Section 409), "Disciplinary Appeals" (Section 604). (EL 1593-1594, 1601, 1609-1612). 
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Cabaness never took the concerns he had regarding Thomas or Michaelis to the City 
Manager, in compliance with the policies set forth in the Manual. (R. 1298 at 115-116:25, 1-
4). Similarly, he never filed any appeal regarding his alleged constructive termination to the 
City Manager, the City's Board of Appeals, or the City Council, nor did he otherwise avail 
himself of the appeal rights provided for in the Manual. (R. 1297 at 104:14-16). 
7. The statements in paragraph 7 are inaccurate and constitute improper 
assertions of opinions and legal conclusions as facts. Also, the evidence cited in support of 
these statements is inadmissible and fails to comply with Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure.5 Appellees submit that many of the incidents detailed in Cabaness' fact statement 
are not relevant to this case because they occurred many years ago, or because he was not 
even present during the alleged incidents. As discussed below, appellees maintain that the 
only relevant incidents are those which occurred between the four-year period of March 31, 
2000 through March 31, 2004.6 During his deposition, Cabaness was given the opportunity 
to detail all of the alleged conduct by appellees that forms the basis of his lawsuit. His 
deposition establishes that only the conduct set forth in subparagraphs (a) through (f) 
5Affidavits reflecting an affiant's unsubstantiated conclusions and opinions are 
inadmissible. See, e.g., In the Matter of the General Determination of Rights, 982 P.2d 65, 72 (Utah 
1999) (affidavit stricken that was riddled with hearsay, conclusory and lacked foundation); 
Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Or, Inc., 2003 UT 23, | 50, 70 P.3d 904; Williams v. Melby, 
699 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1985); Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 1985) (disregarding 
affidavit statements that consisted of unsubstantiated opinions and conclusions); Norton v. 
Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 864 (Utah 1983); Capital Assets Fin. Sew. v. Lindsay, 956 P.2d 1090, 
1094 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (legal conclusions in affidavits are not admissible); GNS 
Partnership v. Fullmer, 873 P.2d 1157 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
6A four year statute of limitations applies to Cabaness' tort and implied contract 
claims. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 (1996) (renumbered as Utah Code Ann. §78B-2-
309). Since Cabaness filed his Notice of Claim herein on March 31, 2004, only the conduct 
occurring during the four-year period prior to that date is relevant. 
6 
definitely took place within this four-year period, while the conduct detailed in 
subparagraphs (g) through (m) may have occurred during this four-year period: 
(a) In late 2003, Thomas allegedly told Cabaness that he needed to leave 
his wife. (R. 1291 at 68:3-11). When Cabaness told him that his relationship with his 
wife was not Thomas' business and he should not talk to him about it, Thomas 
stopped discussing the issue with Cabaness. (R. 1291 at 68:11-14). 
(b) In 2003, after Cabaness' crew had to re-dig an underground line and 
replace a pipe because a different crew had done the work improperly, Thomas asked 
Cabaness, in front of the other crew, how he liked doing their work. Cabaness said 
that it didn't matter. Thomas asked the other crew foreman what he thought, and 
that crew foreman said, "I'm sorry I'm not perfect. I made a mistake." Thomas then 
said to that crew foreman, "Boy you've got a bad attitude. I'm going to have to write 
you up on that." (R. 1285-1286 at 39:20-41:1). 
(c) In 2002 or 2003, Cabaness told Thomas that he replaced a blown fuse 
on a power line near an elementary school three times in one week and that it was a 
potentially hazardous condition for the school children. Thomas said okay but 
nothing was done to correct the problem until five or six months later. (R. 1292 at 
69:10-71:23). 
(d) In 2000 or 2001, Cabaness was getting ready to set a pole on a new line 
for a substation. Thomas told Cabaness to set a different pole. Cabaness thought 
this created additional, unnecessary work. (R. 1289 at 53:14-54:25). 
(e) In March 2000, Thomas singled Cabaness out for not wearing his 
Bountiful Power hat. Cabaness was not aware if anything was said to other lineman 
7 
who did not wear their Bountiful Power hats. (R. 1299 at 134:20-135:18). 
(f) In 2000, after a car had struck a transmission pole, Thomas instructed 
Cabaness to bring a replacement pole to the site. Thomas complained to Cabaness 
that the two men cutting down the old pole were not doing it right and told him to 
tell the men they needed to do it differently. Cabaness refused and Thomas turned 
and stomped away. (R. 1288 at 50:23-52:7). 
(g) In the late nineties or early 2000, two crews were assigned to pull some 
wire at a school. After the crews had positioned the trucks to pull the wire, Thomas 
arrived and told Cabaness that the crews could not pull wire the way they were set up 
and told him to change the trucks' positions. Cabaness said, "we have been pulling 
wire like that for years, why change." Thomas replied, "I'm the boss you move the 
stuff. If you don't, you're insubordinate and I can fire you for that." The other crew 
foreman asked Thomas why he wanted the trucks moved and Thomas said, "Oh, now 
I have two foreman that don't do what I tell them." He told Cabaness and the other 
crew foreman that he was the boss and if they didn't do what he said, he was going to 
write them up and they could get fired for stuff like that. The trucks' positions were 
not switched. Thomas then told Cabaness and the other crew foreman that, as far as 
he was concerned, they had mended things and that nothing else was going to 
happen. (R. 1286-1287 at 42:25-45:24). 
(h) Periodically the power department would get new trucks. Thomas 
would lock the trucks and not allow the lineman to see inside and start the trucks. 
Thomas explained that he did not want the linemen messing with the trucks. Later, 
when the linemen asked if they could look at the new trucks, Thomas threw the keys 
8 
on the ground and said they could look at the trucks. (R. 1290 at 61:1-62:5). 
(i) Almost weekly as the lineman would gather by their trucks to talk, 
Thomas would stare at them and say, "let's go, let's get this job done." When 
Cabaness responded he needed to brief his lineman about the day's assignment, 
Thomas would tell Cabaness to get in his truck and get going. Sometimes, Thomas 
would walk out of his office, put his hands up, and look like he wanted the crews to 
leave to take care of their assignments. (R. 1290 at 63:5-64:20). 
(j) At times when it was raining the linemen would want to stay inside but 
Thomas would have them go outside to work on the assigned jobs. When asked by 
the linemen why they couldn't wait until it stopped raining, Thomas said that he had 
bought them rain gear they could use. (R. 1295 at 82:8-20). 
(k) Thomas commonly responded to linemen who told him they had 
finished their assigned tasks by saying "Congratulations" in a sarcastic manner, or 
"What do you want, a star on your forehead?" (R. 1291 at 65:3-17). 
(1). Thomas would comment that none of the men wanted to work and 
that they had "piss poor attitudes." (R. 1291 at 65:25-66:9). 
(m) When Cabaness and others told Thomas they had problems 
communicating with him and he was not approachable, Thomas said "this is the way I 
am. You can't change the spots on a dog." (R. 1291 at 66:14-20). 
8. This paragraph should be stricken because it is based on the untimely Mears 
Affidavit, which was submitted after the trial court had ruled on the parties' summary 
judgment motions. The trial court properly determined that the Mears and Quinn Affidavits 
9 
should not be considered and it ordered that they be stricken.7 Furthermore, this hearsay 
evidence is immaterial because what Mears was told or believed is not at issue in this lawsuit. 
9-10. Paragraphs 9 and 10 constitute improper assertions of opinions and legal 
conclusions as facts, and should be stricken because they rely solely on the untimely Affidavit 
and Report of Dr. Rick D. Hawks, Cabaness' expert witness. On July 26, 2006, the trial 
court ruled that the Hawks Report, which had not been submitted to the court until long 
after the cross-motions for summary judgment were fully briefed, would not be admitted or 
considered in ruling on the summary judgment motions. (R. 4440). Six months later, the 
Hawks Report and Affidavit were attached as exhibits to the lengthy McComas Affidavit, 
filed in support of the Rule 59 Motion. (R. 3889-3910). By joint stipulation, however, the 
McComas Affidavit was withdrawn, and the Hilton Affidavit was substituted in its place. (R. 
3994-3995). The Hawks Report and Affidavit were not attached as exhibits to the Hilton 
Affidavit (R. 4110-4157). As discussed in greater detail below, the trial court properly ruled 
that the Hawks Report and Affidavit should be disregarded because they did not constitute 
"new evidence" that satisfied the standards set forth in Rules 59 or 60 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. (R. 4565). 
11. The statements in paragraph 11 are inaccurate and argumentative, and are not 
supported by any citation to the record. As a result, they should not be considered. 
12. The statements in paragraph 12 are inaccurate and constitute improper 
7The trial court stated these affidavits were stricken for the reasons set forth in 
defendants' motion, (R. 4229-4234, 4439-4444, 4565), because they were untimely, and 
because Cabaness failed to satisfy the necessary showing of surprise and that the information 
could not have been previously discovered and timely submitted. The trial court also ruled 
that the evidence in these affidavits were cumulative, incidental and, if considered, would not 
change the trial court's decision. (R. 4565). 
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assertions of opinions and legal conclusions as facts. Also, the evidence cited in support of 
the statements is inadmissible, and the evidence cited does not support the characterizations 
set forth in paragraph 12. For example, paragraph 10 of the Knighton Affidavit is 
inadmissible because it refers to a meeting that occurred more than eleven years before 
Cabaness terminated his employment with the City. Also, paragraph 10 and paragraph 15 of 
the Knighton Affidavit, and the cited portion of Fames' deposition, are conclusory and 
based on inadmissible hearsay. The trial judge ruled the Knighton Affidavit was conclusory 
and, therefore, not helpful. Furthermore, the testimony cited from Fames' deposition at 
most shows that Thomas was interested in how long it would take to complete certain tasks. 
(R. 1519 at 72:19-21). 
13. Cabaness testified that there were times when Thomas used the referenced 
profanities, but that Thomas did not use them every time he was critical of Cabaness. (R. 
2120 at 33:1-34:14). Also, the Hawks Report is inadmissible and should not be considered. 
See Response to fflf 9-10, above. 
14. The allegations in paragraph 14 should not be considered. Cabaness was not 
present during the conversation and his testimony as to what occurred is based on 
inadmissible hearsay. (R. 2130 at 73:5-9). Cabaness also failed to establish that the conduct 
occurred within the relevant four-year period. 
15. The statements in paragraph 15 are inaccurate and constitute improper 
assertions of opinions and legal conclusions as facts. Also, the evidence cited in support of 
the statements is inadmissible and does not support the characterizations set forth in 
paragraph 15. For example, Cabaness relies on his own deposition testimony wherein he 
alleges certain conduct occurred. However, Cabaness testified that the incident occurred 
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before 1996 (R. 2121 at 37:5-16), which is outside the four-year period and, therefore, is 
irrelevant. The cited statements from the Knighton Affidavit are also irrelevant in that they 
refer to conduct that occurred outside the relevant four-year period. Regardless, none of the 
evidence cited in paragraph 15, even if it was admissible, establishes the statements and 
characterizations made in paragraph 15. 
16. The conduct alleged in paragraph 16 is immaterial and should not be 
considered. Cabaness testified that the incident occurred before 1996 (R. 2121 at 37:5-16), 
which is outside the relevant four-year period. 
17. The specific conduct alleged in paragraph 17 is irrelevant because Cabaness 
has failed to establish that it occurred within the relevant four-year period. In addition, the 
characterization of the motive for Thomas' directions to his subordinates constitutes 
inadmissible speculation and should not be considered. 
18. The conduct alleged in paragraph 18 is undisputed for purposes of this appeal. 
However, the characterization of Thomas' motives constitutes inadmissible speculation and 
should not be considered. 
19. The conduct alleged in paragraph 19 is based on inadmissible hearsay. 
Cabaness was not present during the alleged incident, and he has not established that it 
occurred during the relevant four-year period. (R. 2133 at 85:20-23). 
20. The conduct alleged in paragraph 20 is undisputed for purposes of this appeal. 
However, the characterization of Thomas' motives should not be considered because it is 
based upon inadmissible speculation. 
21. It is undisputed for purposes of this appeal that there were occasions when 
Thomas threatened to terminate the employment of certain subordinates. The evidence 
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cited, however, does not establish how often this occurred during the relevant four-year 
period. Moreover, Cabaness admitted that he was familiar with the Manual and was generally 
familiar with its contents (R. 1296 at 97-98:24-25:1-19), and therefore he knew, or should 
have known, that Thomas did not have the authority to terminate him and that only a 
Department Head or the City Manager had the authority to terminate employees. (R. 1608 at 
§ 602(b)(5)). Furthermore, the characterization of Thomas' motives should not be 
considered because it is based upon inadmissible speculation. 
22. The conduct alleged in paragraph 22 is immaterial, in that the conduct alleged 
is outside the four-year period, and was not directed at Cabaness. The evidence does not 
establish whether Cabaness was present during the incident, or whether his testimony is 
based on inadmissible hearsay. Cf (R. 1509 at 29:25-30:5). Also, the characterization of 
Thomas' motives is based on inadmissible speculation. 
23. The statements in paragraph 23 are inaccurate and inconsistent with the cited 
evidence. Cabaness' testimony with respect to Thomas stating, ccYou are lucky to have this 
job. If you don't do what you are told, we can fire you" was in response to a question 
regarding what occurred during his first four years of employment (which employment began 
in 1978). Cabaness did not testify that the statement was made to him "regularly", rather he 
testified "it happened at least, I would say, every six months, every year, you know, around 
there." (R. 2118-2119 at 28:9-29:16). The citation to the Knighton Affidavit is immaterial 
and should not be considered because it refers to a meeting that occurred outside the 
relevant four-year period. The cited evidence does not show that Thomas criticized 
Cabaness publicly about personal and confidential issues, or that any of the alleged conduct 
occurred during the four-year period. Also, the characterization of Thomas' motives is 
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inadmissible speculation. 
24. The statements in paragraph 24 are inaccurate and inconsistent with the cited 
evidence. Cabaness testified that when he told Thomas that his relationship with his wife 
was none of Thomas' business and to drop the subject, Thomas dropped the subject. (R. 
2128 at 68:11-14). 
25. The statements in paragraph 25 are immaterial, inaccurate and inconsistent 
with the record. Cabaness testified of one, and only one, physical altercation involving 
Thomas, and that it occurred in the early 1990s (R. 2132 at 84:9-11), which is consistent with 
Hutchings' testimony that it occurred approximately five to six years before he quit his job in 
1999. (R. 1952 at ffif 5, 7). Thus, the alleged incident occurred in 1993 or 1994, which is well 
outside the relevant four-year period. This is also true even if it occurred in 1999 and, 
regardless, Thomas' conduct was not physical abuse; rather, it was a response to Hutchings 
pushing Thomas. (R. 1508-1509 at 28:22-29:7). Also, Thomas' conduct was not directed to 
Cabaness. (R. 2132 at 84:5-7). 
26. The conduct alleged in paragraph 26 is immaterial and should not be 
considered. Cabaness testified that the incident occurred in 1983 or 1984 (R. 2132 at 81:12-
13), which is at least sixteen years prior to the relevant four-year period. Also, Cabaness did 
not testify that he had received a shock or that he knew he could have been killed. (R. 2132 
at 81:14-82:3). Furthermore, he testified that he was already up the pole when he told 
Thomas he needed to put a ground on the wire. (R. 2132 at 81:15-16). 
27. The conduct alleged in paragraph 27 is immaterial and should not be 
considered. Cabaness testified that the incident occurred in the mid-1990s (R. 2131 at 79:14-
15), which is outside the relevant four-year period. Cabaness did not testify that Thomas 
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ordered the crew to do their work without the proper safety equipment. He testified that 
Thomas said to open the door and start their work. (R. 2132 at 81:14-82:3). The statement 
that Thomas knew it was unsafe to do so constitutes improper speculation. 
28. The conduct alleged in paragraph 28 is immaterial and should not be 
considered. Cabaness was not in the immediate vicinity of the incident and his testimony is 
based on inadmissible hearsay. (R. 2131-2132 at 80:23-81:4). Cabaness also testified that the 
incident occurred in the mid-1990s (R. 2131 at 79:14-15), which is outside the relevant four-
year period. Furthermore, Cabaness did not testify that the crew "lacked the right safety 
equipment/5 he testified that the switch they were working on didn't have safety devices on it 
because it was an old piece of equipment. (R. 2131 at 80:5-6). 
29. The evidence cited does not fully support the statements in paragraph 29. For 
example, the evidence cited refers to work Thomas directed the lineman to do in the rain, 
not the wind and snow. Moreover, when Cabaness was asked, "Were there occasions when 
there were emergencies that had to be done in the rain," he responded, "Always." (R. 2132 
at 83:12-17). 
30. The evidence does not support the allegation that every month Thomas cut 
the safety meetings short of the planned time. Rather, Cabaness testified that the safety 
meetings were to last anywhere from one to two hours and that Thomas did not say that they 
were done and needed to go to work until "like an hour" after the meeting started. (R. 2145 
at 136:19-25). 
31-32. The statements in paragraphs 31 and 32 are immaterial and should not be 
considered. The jackhammer incident occurred outside of Cabaness' presence while 
Cabaness was on extended leave. (R. 2125 at 56:1; R. 2126 at 60:8-21; R. 1941 at f 15; R. 
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2052 at ]f 7). Cabaness did not return to work from his leave of absence for more than one 
month after the incident. (R. 2052 at j^ 7). Cabaness' deposition and affidavit testimony of 
the incident should also not be considered because his testimony is based on inadmissible 
hearsay. (R. 2126 at 60:17-21). Moreover, the characterizations of Thomas' knowledge, as 
well as the alleged motive for Thomas' directions to his subordinates, constitute inadmissible 
speculation and should not be considered. 
33. It is undisputed that Cabaness was not present for the jackhammer incident 
that occurred on July 30, 2003. (R. 2125 at 56:1). The remainder of the statements in 
paragraph 33 are immaterial and should not be considered because they rely solely on the 
inadmissible Hawks Report. See Response to fflf 9-10, above. 
34. The evidence cited does not support the statements made in paragraph 34. 
35. The statements in paragraphs 35 are immaterial and should not be considered 
because Cabaness was not present during the jackhammer incident. It is undisputed that 
Cabaness was Safety Director, and that the persons listed were on the Safety Committee 
which investigated the jackhammer incident and issued reports. However, Cabaness was off 
work between July 23, 2003 and September 8, 2003, and did not participate in the 
investigation of this incident. (R. 1769 at 44:10-24; R. 2052 at \ 7). 
36-39. The statements in paragraphs 36, 37, 38 and 39 are supported only by citations 
to reports that constitute inadmissible hearsay. The statements are also immaterial and 
should not be considered because Cabaness was not present during the jackhammer incident. 
Furthermore: (1) regarding paragraph 39, the reports do not indicate that the Safety 
Committee cited Thomas with a serious safety violation; rather, the reports indicate that the 
Safety Committee merely recommended that Thomas be given a serious safety violation 
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citation (R. 2013); (2) regarding paragraph 38, the report cited does not state who told the 
Safety Committee that Michaelis was conducting an investigation, nor does the report cited 
state that the accusations of intimidation Michaelis was investigating were about Thomas; 
and (3) regarding paragraph 39, the evidence cited does not specifically mention Thomas or 
Tuttle. 
40. Undisputed for purposes this appeal. Cabaness was off work pursuant to a 
request for medical leave. (R. 2053 at Tf 7). 
41. The statements in paragraph 41 are not supported by the evidence cited. 
Michaelis testified that he believed Cabaness' doctor had stated that Cabaness was being 
treated with antidepressants for depression during his leave. (R. 1855 at 73:20-74:1). 
Michaelis testified he would have shared that information with Thomas. (R. 1855 at 74:2-5). 
The record cited does not refer to Cabaness' mental health as being "fragile." 
42. Most of the statements in paragraph 42 are not established by the evidence 
cited. For purposes of this appeal, it is undisputed that, during an employee meeting on 
September 9, 2003, Thomas said he was considering firing Cabaness. The evidence cited 
does not establish the other statements. Cabaness has not established that Michaelis had any 
personal knowledge of what was said during this employee meeting. The testimony cited 
from the Fames deposition does not refer to an employee meeting on September 9, 2003. 
The cited testimony in the McComas Affidavit is obviously improper since it is based on 
inadmissible hearsay, not personal knowledge. 
43. Undisputed for purposes of this appeal. 
44-46. The statements in paragraphs 44, 45 and 46 regarding what the committee 
"learned" during interviews rely on inadmissible hearsay and should not be considered. Also, 
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any evidence regarding conduct that occurred outside the relevant four-year period is 
irrelevant and should not be considered. Regardless, the evidence cited in paragraph 45 fails 
to establish that Michaelis did not take any action to correct Thomas' conduct. Rather, the 
citation to Michaelis5 testimony establishes that Michaelis thought he had dealt with Thomas 
when he received complaints about Thomas in the early 1990s, the mid 1990s, and in 2003, 
and that Michaelis thought that Thomas' conduct had improved. (R. 1852 at 62:24-64:14; R. 
1853 at 68:12-16; R. 1854 at 69:5-22, 70:4-7, 71:5-10, 71:21-72:18; R. 1858 at 85:8-24). The 
evidence cited also does not establish that Michaelis told employees they would be 
terminated if they complained again about Thomas. Rather, Michaelis testified that he told 
the employees that he had taken care of what occurred in the past and their job was to go 
forward and not bring up complaints from the past. (R. 1852 at 63:21-64:14). The statement 
in paragraph 46 that Thomas had threatened to fire employees who took complaints over his 
head relies on inadmissible hearsay and should not be considered. (R. 1889 at 210:20-23). 
Also, much of the testimony cited is conclusory, and Cabaness has not established that the 
testimony cited refers to conduct that occurred within the relevant four-year period. 
47. Undisputed for purposes of this appeal. However, evidence of what occurred 
at the jackhammer incident is irrelevant since Cabaness was not present. 
48-49. Inaccurate. While it is undisputed that Michaelis' letter to Thomas states, 
"Your intimidation needs to stop" and that, over and over again, employees said "that this 
man needs to change" (R. 2039), the letter does not state that each employee interviewed 
begged Michaelis to make Thomas change. Michaelis' letter also told Thomas that, if he did 
not change "over the next few months," Michaelis would help him retire. (R. 2039). 
Michaelis planned on giving Thomas ninety days to change so that the feeling of 
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disgruntlement among the employees could be overcome. (R. 1866 at 117:11-21). 
50. Undisputed for purposes of this appeal. 
51. Inaccurate. The sanction recommended by the Safety Committee was 
enforced. Thomas wrote a memorandum that accepted his actions that led to the incident, 
despite the fact that he strongly disagreed with the findings of the Safety Committee. (R. 
1496). Thomas' statement that he had changed as much as he was going to change and that 
'"You can't change the spots on a dog" were made on September 9, 2003. (R. 1518-1519 at 
68:1-69:4). The Safety Committee report is dated September 10, 2003. Thus, Thomas' 
"spots on a dog" statement was made before the Safety Committee's recommendation and 
before Michaelis wrote Thomas the warning letter. (R. 1496-1497). 
52. The statements in paragraph 52 are inaccurate and rely on inadmissible 
evidence. Michaelis did not testify that he was responsible to implement the Manual; nor did 
he testify that the City followed its provisions for discipline and termination for City 
employees besides Thomas. (R. 1861); see Response to |^ 6, above. The Mears and Quinn 
Affidavits are inadmissible and do not state that Michaelis was responsible to implement the 
Manual nor that the City did not follow its provisions for discipline and termination with 
Thomas. Regardless, both affidavits were untimely and were properly stricken by the trial 
court. See footnote 7, above. Also, the hearsay evidence in the affidavits is immaterial 
because what Mears or Quinn were told or believed is not at issue in this lawsuit. 
53. The statements in paragraph 53 should not be considered because Cabaness 
has failed to provide any supporting citation to the record. See Response to f^ 45, above. 
54. The statements in paragraph 54 are inaccurate, immaterial and/or based on 
hearsay and should not be considered. According to the evidence cited, the conversation 
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with Shafter occurred in 1986, which is outside the relevant four-year period. Cabaness' 
allegation as to what Shafter said is inadmissible hearsay. The evidence cited fails to establish 
that no action was taken; rather, it only establishes that Cabaness did not know if Shafter 
passed on his complaints about Thomas to Michaelis. (R. 1387 at |^ 21). 
55. The statements in paragraph 55 are inaccurate and some are immaterial 
because they refer to conduct that occurred outside the relevant four-year period. The 
evidence cited does not establish that Michaelis received complaints about Thomas from the 
early 1990s "through" 2003, and Michaelis testified that he only received such complaints in 
the early 1990s, the mid-1990s and in 2003. (R. 1854 at 69:4-9). 
56. The statements in paragraph 56 are inaccurate and immaterial, and some are 
based on inadmissible hearsay. The evidence cited does not establish that Michaelis received 
complaints about Thomas prior to 1991. The statements are immaterial because they refer to 
conduct that occurred outside the relevant four-year period. The cited evidence in paragraph 
11 of the Hutchings Affidavit is inadmissible hearsay. 
57-59. The statements in paragraphs 57, 58 and 59 are immaterial because they refer 
to conduct that occurred outside the relevant four-year period. 
60. The statements in paragraph 60 are not supported by the evidence cited, are 
immaterial, and are based on speculation and hearsay. The statements are immaterial because 
they refer to conduct that occurred outside the relevant four-year period. The statements 
regarding Thomas' motive in writing a letter, and whether it was unjust to threaten to 
terminate Cabaness' employment, should not be considered because they are based on 
inadmissible hearsay, constitute improper speculation or a legal conclusion, and are 
inconsistent with the tone of the letter. (R. 1956-1957). 
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61. The statements in paragraph 61 are immaterial because the meeting occurred 
in 1997, which is outside the relevant four-year period. 
62. The statements in paragraph 62 are irrelevant and based on hearsay and should 
not be considered. Based on the evidence cited, the conversation with Shafter occurred in 
1997, which is outside the relevant four-year period. Also, Cabaness' allegation as to what 
Shafter said is inadmissible hearsay. (R. 1387 at f^ 21). 
63. Inaccurate. Dr. Warden's notes for August 4, 1997, state that Cabaness has 
been receiving unusual stress at work, that "has been persisting for a long time plus stress in 
his own family. He's having depression with much anxiety." (R. 2044). The evidence cited 
shows Cabaness was prescribed an antidepressant on August 4 and 21, 1997. The evidence 
cited does not establish that Cabaness was treated with antidepressants through June 1999. 
64-66. The statements in paragraph 66 are not supported by the evidence cited, and 
the statements in paragraphs 64, 65 and 66 are immaterial and irrelevant because the 
referenced meeting occurred in 1997 or early 1998, which is outside the relevant four-year 
period. See also, Response to fflf 44-46, above, regarding Michaelis' statements. 
67. The statements in paragraph 67 are immaterial because Cabaness has not 
established that the conduct occurred within the relevant four-year period. 
68. The statements in paragraph 68 are immaterial to the extent they rely on 
conduct that Cabaness has not established occurred within the relevant four-year period. 
69. The statements in paragraph 69 are based on inadmissible hearsay, and are 
irrelevant because the alleged conduct did not occur within the relevant four-year period. 
70. The statements in paragraph 70 are inaccurate and not supported by the 
evidence cited. Dr. VandeMerwe treated Cabaness from June 24, 2003 to April 19, 2004. 
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(R. 2052 at fflf 3-4). Sometime during that period, Dr. VandeMerwe diagnosed Cabaness 
with major depression/chronic dysthymia with insomnia. (R. 2052 at f^ 5). There was also a 
question of whether Cabaness was bipolar. (R. 2052 at |^ 7). Based upon Cabaness' account 
of his employment situation, Dr. VandeMerwe considered Cabaness' leave from work to be 
for depression attributed to a hostile work environment and an abusive boss. (R. 2052 at f^ 
7). It is undisputed that Cabaness was treated with antidepressants. (R. 2052 at ^ 6-7).8 
71. Undisputed for purposes of this appeal. 
72. The statements in paragraph 72 are not supported by the evidence cited. See 
Response to f^ 41, above. The record cited does not refer to Cabaness' mental condition as 
being "fragile" or "work-related major" depression. 
73. The statements in paragraph 73 should not be considered because they rely 
upon inadmissible hearsay. Also, the Knighton Affidavit is conclusory. 
74. Paragraph 74 should be stricken because the statements therein rely solely on 
the Hawks Affidavit, which was stricken. See supra Response to ^[ 9-10. 
75. The statements in paragraph 75 are irrelevant to the issues in this appeal and 
should not be considered. 
8Significantly, there were significant other sources of stress in Cabaness' life including: 
(1) he suffered from a bad back, sinus problems and a deviated septum (R. 1301-1302 at 
176:12-178:10); (2) he was diagnosed with erectile dysfunction (R. 1328); he suffered from 
lack of sex drive in 2003 (R. 1306 at 195:2-4); (4) he had marital problems (R. 1302-1303 at 
180:21-181:18); (5) he had significant financial problems having filed bankruptcy on two 
occasions, including a filing for bankruptcy in 2003 when he lost his home (R. 1303 at 
183:19-185:24); (6) his daughter was charged with DUI on more than one occasion during 
his employment with the City (R. 1304 at 186:18-188:4); (7) his son was convicted of crimes 
related to drug use and burglaries, and served six months in jail (R. 1304-1305 at 188:5-
190:18); and (8) he was depressed by his lack of church attendance which resulted from his 
early release from service in an LDS bishopric, which embarrassed him. (R. 1305-1306 at 
192:21-194:13). 
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76. The statement in paragraph 76 with respect to what Mayor Johnson allegedly 
said to Tuttle is inadmissible hearsay and should not be considered. 
77. It is undisputed that Cabaness terminated his employment with the City on 
January 4, 2004. (R. 5-6 at f^ 19). The remaining statements are conclusory and constitute 
legal argument. In addition, when Cabaness resigned, he had accepted a job with Kaysville 
Power to do the same work. (EL 1297 at 101:13-14; 104:20-22). He terminated his 
employment of his own volition, without anyone telling him that he had to quit, nor did the 
City ever tell him that it wanted him to resign. (R. 1297 at 101:3-7). Also, the City never 
instituted any disciplinary procedures or actions against Cabaness. (R. 1297 at 104:17-24). 
78. Inaccurate. Sandberg did not testify that the work environment was the sole 
cause of Cabaness' depression and panic disorder; rather, he testified they were caused, "in 
substantial part" by the work environment. (R. 2059 at f^ 6). 
79. The statements in paragraph 79 are based, in part, on inadmissible hearsay and 
speculation. The statements are also immaterial because Cabaness is the only plaintiff in the 
lawsuit, and the fact that others quit their employment is not relevant to Cabaness' claims. 
Also, the evidence cited is based, in part, on inadmissible hearsay regarding the reasons some 
employees quit The statement regarding Michaelis' knowledge and motivation are based on 
improper speculation. 
80-81. Undisputed for purposes of this appeal. Dr. Smith's opinion as to the cause 
of Cabaness' mental problems is based on the history he received from Cabaness. (R. 2068 
at H 7). 
82-83. The statements in paragraphs 82 and 83 are irrelevant to the issues on appeal. 
Also, to the extent these statements rely on the Hawks Report and Affidavit, the statements 
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should not be considered. See Response to fflf 9-10, above 
84. Undisputed for purposes of this appeal. 
85. The statements in paragraph 85 are immaterial and inaccurate. No disciplinary 
procedures were instituted against Cabaness during his employment with the City. (R. 1297 
at 104:17-24). 
86. The statements in paragraph 86 are immaterial and inaccurate. Thomas is a 
named defendant in this matter and had the right to be present at each deposition taken in 
this case. Furthermore, conduct that occurred after the lawsuit was filed is not material to 
Cabaness' claims. Cabaness has also failed to properly cite to the record to show that the 
issue was before the trial court at the time it rendered its decision. 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Specifically, this Court should affirm the trial court's rulings below for the following 
reasons. First, Cabaness failed to come forward with sufficient admissible evidence from 
which a reasonable jury could conclude that the subject Manual provisions created an implied 
contract. The unambiguous terms of the Manual itself do not create an implied contract. 
The untimely Quinn and Mears Affidavits were properly stricken and cannot be relied upon, 
and the relevant case law does not support Cabaness' position. 
Alternatively, Cabaness' implied contract claims are barred by the Immunity Act 
because they are based on the same conduct that he alleges caused him to suffer emotional 
distress and immunity has not been waived for claims that arise out of the infliction of 
mental anguish. Relevant case law also establishes that no emotional distress damages are 
allowed for a breach of contract claim, and the only recognized exception to this rule is in 
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the case of insurance contracts. 
Cabaness' claim for "wrongful constructive termination" is a tort claim that is barred 
by the Immunity Act and by Cabaness' failure to show that his "constructive termination" 
contravened "a clear and substantial public policy." Moreover, even if this claim is deemed 
to be a contract claim, which result would be extremely unfair to appellees, it is barred for 
the same reasons that the first claim fails. Finally, in considering whether the alleged conduct 
of Thomas and Michaelis satisfies the requisite high standard of a claim of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, one should only consider admissible evidence, the actual 
facts, and not incidents where Cabaness was not present or those that occurred outside the 
four-year statute of limitations. Based on the applicable legal standard, the relevant evidence 
here does not support an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. T H E SUBJECT POLICIES OF THE MANUAL DO NOT CREATE AN 
IMPLIED CONTRACT. 
In his first claim for relief, Cabaness alleges the City breached both an implied 
employment contract and an implied good faith covenant based on the novel argument that 
certain City policies regarding work-place environment, violence, standards of conduct and 
harassment give rise to a contractual obligation on the part of the City to ensure that its 
employees do not experience any of the prohibited conduct. Under Cabaness5 theory, if an 
employer warns its employees that they may be subject to discipline for engaging in certain 
misconduct, that employer is then contractually liable to an employee who is the victim of 
any such misconduct Such a result would wreak havoc on employers and expose them to 
unforeseen liability. The trial court properly rejected this argument and held that the relevant 
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policies, on their face, do not give rise to an implied contractual obligation. 
1. The Relevant Personnel Policies Are Warnings To Employees, And Do 
Not Create Any Contractual Obligations. 
Cabaness specifically claims that an implied employment contract is created by the 
Manual's policies regarding work environment, harassment and standards of conduct. 
Nothing in these provisions, however, establishes that the City is undertaking an affirmative 
contractual obligation to protect its employees from the misconduct described therein, or to 
guarantee its employees that the prohibited conduct will not occur in the workplace. The 
fact that these provisions are included in the Manual evidences the possibility that the 
described misconduct may, in fact, occur in the workplace. The Manual does not guarantee 
that City employees will only work with other employees or supervisors who are pleasant and 
polite, and who will never engage in misconduct. 
Rather, these provisions put employees on notice of what is expected of them and 
what constitutes employee misconduct. They warn employees not to engage in the conduct 
described therein, and they state certain policies and goals of the City. By including these 
policies in its Manual, the City is not promising its employees that the subject misconduct 
will not occur in the workplace, nor is the City undertaking a contractual obligation to 
protect its employees from such misconduct. 
To hold otherwise would expose Utah employers to unprecedented and unforseen 
contractual liability. For example, employee handbooks commonly provide that it is an 
employer's policy to prohibit assault, theft, damage to property, and profanity, but also to 
warn its employees that they may be disciplined for engaging in such misconduct. It is 
incredulous to think that promulgation of these policies renders an employer contractually 
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liable to any employee who is a victim of the prohibited conduct. If this were the case, every 
incident of workplace theft, violence, threat, abuse, profanity, or intimidation may expose an 
employer to a claim for breach of an implied contract Public policy is not "served by 
allowing contractual recovery under such policies and procedures, as employers might thus 
be chary of publicizing and enforcing their complaint procedures." Peralta v. Cendant Corp., 
123 F.Supp.2d 65, 84 (D. Conn. 2000). 
2. Cabaness5 Unilateral Expectations Are Insufficient To Create An 
Implied Contract. 
This claim also fails because Cabaness failed to offer sufficient admissible evidence at 
the summary judgment stage to create a material issue of fact that the City had entered into 
an implied contract to protect him from the subject conduct. Cabaness bears the burden of 
proof on this issue. See Wood v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 2001 UT App 35, j^ 14, 19 P.3d 
392 ("Plaintiffs have 'the burden of proof of establishing the existence of an implied-in-fact 
contract provision."'). In a futile effort to carry this burden, Cabaness offered his own 
affidavit testimony regarding his "expectation" or what he "considered" the City's 
contractual obligation to be. This is not sufficient to satisfy his burden. See id. ^ 15, 16 
(holding plaintiffs' affidavits that included statements as to what they believed or what their 
impression was with respect to the contract did not meet plaintiffs' burden of establishing an 
implied contract provision). Indeed, 
A mutual intent to form a contract is necessary to show that an implied-in-fact 
contract exists. A unilateral expectation on the part of the employee does not 
create an implied-in-fact contract for continued employment. A reasonable 
person must be able to find from all relevant circumstances of the plaintiffs 
employment that there was an intent on both sides to be bound. 
Pants v. Mission Hills Bank, N.A., 60 F.3d 1486,1492 (10th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). 
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Even though it was his burden to do so, Cabaness offered no evidence at the summary 
judgment stage of the City's intent to create any such contractual obligations. Thus, the trial 
court appropriately determined, as a matter of law, that no reasonable jury could find the 
existence of an implied contract. See Wood, 2001 UT App 35, ^  13.9 
3. The Trial Court Properly Excluded The Improper And Untimely 
Affidavits Of Mears and Quinn. 
On appeal, Cabaness tries to satisfy his evidentiary burden by relying on the untimely 
and stricken Mears and Quinn Affidavits,10 both of which are dated March 1, 2007. Neither 
of these affidavits were offered at the summary judgment stage, and the trial court properly 
excluded them when they were filed in support of the Rule 59 Motion, on the grounds that 
the evidence in the Quinn and Mears Affidavits was not before the Court during summary 
judgment and they did not constitute newly discovered evidence pursuant to Rules 59(a)(4) 
or 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court also determined that many of the 
statements in the Quinn and Mears Affidavits are conclusory, based on speculation, 
conjecture and the affiants' own unsupported opinions. 
For evidence to be considered after judgment is entered, a party must establish: (1) 
the existence of newly discovered evidence which is material and competent; (2) that by due 
diligence the evidence could not have been discovered and produced before trial; and (3) that 
the evidence is not merely cumulative or incidental, but is substantial enough that with the 
9Cabaness complains that appellees did not brief this issue, but the characterization of 
a policy as a "goal" based upon a simple reading of the policy, without reference to case law, 
is a fair comment at an oral argument and need not be preceded by briefing. 
10Significantly, Ms. Quinn was a former disgruntled City employee who was fired by 
the City for embezzling City funds, and who subsequentiy pled guilty to felony criminal 
charges stemming from her embezzlement. (R. 826, 2431-2435). 
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evidence there is a reasonable likelihood of a different result. See, e.g., Barson v. E.K Squibb <& 
Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 841 (Utah 1984); Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(4).11 
Cabaness failed to meet his substantial burden of showing that this evidence could 
not have been discovered prior to the filing of his post-trial motions.12 To justify the late 
filing of these Affidavits, Cabaness argues that he did not present them earlier because he 
was unaware of defendants' argument that the provisions of the Manual did not create an 
implied contract until July 26, 2006, the first day of hearings on the summary judgment 
motions. (R. 4181-4182 at fflf 5-7). Cabaness, however, had been put on notice that this was 
appellees' position when they filed their Answer herein and denied the allegation in the 
Complaint that the provisions of the Manual "created an implied employment contract 
between" Cabaness and the City.13 (R. 6 at \ 24; R. 30 at f^ 24). Furthermore, proving the 
11
 Granting a new trial based on newly discovered evidence in only limited 
circumstances serves the judicial policy of finality by encouraging parties to fully investigate 
and present their cases at the appropriate time, during pretrial discovery and at trial. Cf 
Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 969 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Thus, it is essential 
that parties seeking a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence meet the due 
diligence component of the rule, "[n]o matter how material or beneficial the [evidence would 
be] on a new trial." See ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 253 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
(quotation & citation omitted). "[Wjhen it appears that the degree of activity or inquiry which 
led to the discovery of a witness or evidence after trial would have produced the same 
evidence had it been exercised prior thereto, due diligence has not been exercised." Id. at 
254. 
12Cabaness was well aware of Ms. Quinn at least two years earlier, inasmuch as he had 
her sign an Affidavit on his behalf which he filed in July of 2005. (R. 725-731). 
13Even if Cabaness first became aware at the summary judgment hearing that 
appellees were claiming the Manual did not create an implied contract, he still could have 
exercised due diligence to raise the issue at that time. Significandy, there were three different 
hearings on the summary judgment motions over a three-week period—July 26, August 10, 
and August 17, 2006. Cabaness certainly had sufficient time to procure and produce the 
Quinn and Mears Affidavits during this three-week period. Cabaness could have also 
advised the Court that he was caught by surprise and asked for additional time to brief the 
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existence of an implied contract is an essential element of Cabaness' claim, for which he 
bears the burden of proof without the benefit of any presumption. 
In addition, pursuant to the legal standard set forth in footnote 5, above, the key 
testimony stricken in these Affidavits was inadmissible because it was conclusory, lacked 
foundation, and merely reflected the affiant's unsubstantiated conclusions, without stating 
facts based upon personal knowledge. For example, this is true of Quinn's affirmations that 
the Manual was designed for her benefit and protection as an employee, and that the Manual 
constituted an agreement between the City and its employees (R. 4170-4171 at fflf 12, 14), as 
well as Mears' statements that he made a good faith effort to make recommendations to the 
Manual that would protect City employees (R. 4163 at f 11), and that he would have objected 
and refused to serve on a committee if he had known that the City thought the Manual's 
provisions were unenforceable goals (R. 4165 at f^ 15). 
4, The Utah Cases Cited by Cabaness Are Distinguishable. 
Significantly, there are no Utah cases which have expanded the implied employment 
contract theory to encompass an employer's policies which identify and prohibit misconduct 
and the cases cited by Cabaness to support his argument are distinguishable. For example, 
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 111 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989) and Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 
P.2d 49 (Utah 1991) both dealt with the issue of whether an employee manual limited the 
employer's right to terminate at-will employees. Indeed, this Court in Brehany stated that, 
"when it is plain that a manual or bulletin does not limit the right to discharge at will, the 
issue and submit the affidavits in question. While appellees would have opposed the request, 
at least the issue could have been dealt with at that stage of the proceedings, instead of 
months later after judgment had been entered. 
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case need not go to a jury/' Id. at 56. While the Court in Canfield v. Layton City, 2005 UT 60, 
122 P.3D 622, stated that "a municipal employer may create an implied contract through its 
personnel policies," that case dealt with an employee who claimed her termination violated 
written policies because the discipline she received was not proportionate to her offense, nor 
was it uniform with how other employees were treated. Id. at fflf 3, 22, 24. 
Here, of course, Cabaness was not an "at-will" employee. The City did not fire him, 
nor did it ever take any disciplinary action against him. Rather, Cabaness quit his job with 
the City in order to go to work for another city. Moreover, though appropriate pre- and 
post-termination due process and grievance procedures were available to Cabaness, he never 
filed a grievance with the City Manager, nor did he appeal his purported "constructive" 
termination. Thus, the cases cited by Cabaness are unavailing. 
Moreover, the conclusion that the subject provisions of the Manual do not create an 
implied contract is supported by the weight of case law in other jurisdictions. See Demasse v. 
ITT Corp., 984 P.2d 1138, 1143 (Ariz. 1999) ("If the statement is merely a description of the 
employer's present policies . . . it is neither a promise nor a statement that could reasonably 
be relied upon as a commitment"); Utton v. Maverick Paper Co., 388 F.Supp.2d 1261,1293 
(D.Kan. 2005) (provisions of an employee handbook regarding the reporting of harassment 
was not sufficient as a matter of law to establish an implied contract of employment); Gaily v. 
Columbia University, 22 F.Supp.2d 199, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (a provision in a code of conduct 
which provided "all students should receive fair and equal treatment" held not to create a 
separate and independent contract obligation). 
5. Cabaness Misstates The Record Below. 
In an effort to salvage his implied contract claims, Cabaness incorrectly asserts that: 
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(1) appellees' counsel conceded that the issue of whether an implied contract exists is a fact 
question for the jury; and (2) the trial court "incorrectly assumed sua sponte, and without 
justification, that the parties had agreed that all of the necessary facts on the implied contract 
issue were before the court. . . ." (Aplt. Brief at 40). Both statements are unsupported by the 
record. 
First, Cabaness has mischaracterized the statement of appellees' counsel. The 
transcripts of the hearing demonstrate that appellees' counsel stated that, while courts have 
held as a matter of law that there was not an implied contract, they have generally not held as 
a matter of law that there is an implied contract because there are generally issues of fact for 
a jury to decide in that circumstance. (R. 4091-4093 at 3-5). This statement is consistent 
with the legal principle that the threshold question of whether there is an implied contract 
(absent ambiguous terms that raise a question of fact) is a question of law for the court. See 
Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon <& Davis Utah, Inc., Ill P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1989); Manning v. Cigna 
Corp., 807 F.Supp. 889, 893 (D. Conn. 1991). 
Second, the trial court expressly stated in its Memorandum Decision, that both sides 
agreed that the Court had before it "all of the facts necessary to determine whether a contract 
exists between plaintiff and the City based on the above-referenced provisions in the 
Manual." (R. 3637). Since Cabaness has failed to include the full transcripts of the summary 
judgment hearings in the record, he cannot demonstrate that this statement by the trial court 
is inaccurate. The trial court noted that, since both sides had moved for summary judgment 
on this issue, it was an "indication" to the trial court "that the parties do not believe there are 
material issues of disputed fact which would preclude the Court from ruling on whether the 
Manual did create a contract between the City and plaintiff." Id. This observation does not 
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constitute an abuse of discretion and is supported by applicable case law.14 See Mastic Tile 
Division ofRuberoid Co. v. Acme Distributing Co,, 389 P.2d 56, 57 (Utah 1964) (when both sides 
of matter lay a decision in the lap of the court by their mutual motions for summary 
judgment, and unequivocally invite and authorize the court to decide the case by interpreting 
the documents, the court should not be required to submit to the subsequent urging of the 
loser that although he took his chances without reservation, he must have another go at the 
case). 
Finally, since there is no implied contract, Cabaness has no claim for breach of an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Heideman v. Washington City, 2007 UT 
App 11, ]f 27 n. 15, 155 P.3d 900 ("because there was no contract, there was necessarily no 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing"). 
In summation, this Court has held that, unless the contract terms are ambiguous and 
raise factual issues, the proper construction of a contract's terms is an issue of law to be 
decided by the court. See Caldwell, 111 P.2d at 486. "The court retains the power to decide 
whether, as a matter of law, a reasonable jury could find that an implied contract exists." 
Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc. 972 P.2d 395, 401 (Utah 1998) (quoting Sanderson v. First Sec. 
'Leasing Co., 844 P.2d 303, 306 (Utah 1992)). Applying this legal standard to this case, the trial 
court correcdy found the Manual is not ambiguous, and correcdy concluded as a matter of 
law that no reasonable jury could find that the subject provisions created an implied contract. 
14The trial court specifically stated that there was no ambiguity in the relevant 
provisions of the Manual, and it also correcdy noted that the Manual's clear and conspicuous 
disclaimer at §101 (b) "precludes the existence of a contract as to any items or rights 
identified in said disclaimer." (R. 3654). "Employee benefits" is one of the rights identified 
in the disclaimer, which encompasses working conditions. 
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B. THE IMMUNITY ACT BARS CABANESS' CONTRACT CLAIMS. 
Alternatively, as the trial court found, Cabaness' implied contract claims are barred by 
the Immunity Act because they are based on the same conduct that he alleges caused him to 
suffer emotional distress. It is well established that immunity has not been waived for claims 
that arise out of the infliction of emotional or mental anguish. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-
10(2) (2003).15 Specifically, the Immunity Act expressly excludes from the waiver of 
immunity, any claim where the "injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from . . . 
infliction of mental anguish." Id. Thus, the court in Atiya v. Salt "Lake County, 852 P.2d 1007 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993), noted that § 63-30-10 contained "an explicit exception to the waiver 
provided for . . . injuries arising out of 'infliction of mental anguish.'"16 Id. at 1011 n. 6 
(emphasis added). Similarly, in Sauers v. Salt hake County, 735 F. Supp. 381, 384 (D. Utah 
1990), the court held that "[t]he waiver of governmental immunity . . . does not include 
injuries which arise out of infliction of mental anguish . . . ." 
15Similar to the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim discussed below, the 
statute of limitations on implied contracts is four years. See State of Utah v. Huntington-Cleveland 
Irrigation Co., 2002 UT 75, ^ f 12, 52 P.3d 1257. Thus, only those incidences which occurred 
from March 31, 2000 to March 31, 2004 (the date Cabaness filed his Notice of Claim) are 
relevant to the implied contract claim. 
16Cabaness incorrectly cites Atiya as a Utah Supreme Court case, when actually it is a 
Utah Court of Appeals decision. See Aplt.'s Brief at 45. Regardless, in Atiya, the court held 
that the plaintiffs claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred by the 
Immunity Act. The court, in dicta, further opined that Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 applies 
only to negligent acts and omissions. However, the dicta is not controlling and it conflicts 
with the list of intentional conduct identified in § 63-30-10, which includes malicious 
prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, assault, battery, and false imprisonment. 
This dicta is also contrary to the holding in Sauers v. Salt Lake County, supra, 735 F. Supp. at 
384. 
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Accordingly, the inquiry here is whether § 63-30-10(2)'s "infliction of mental anguish" 
exception to the waiver of governmental immunity applies to Cabaness' contract claims. In 
resolving this issue, it is important to note that the phrase "arises out o f has a much broader 
meaning than "caused by/' Taylor in re Taylor v. Ogden City Sch. Dist, 927 P.2d 159, 163 (Utah 
1996). In fact, this Court has explained that the words "arises out o f "are very broad, 
general and comprehensive. They are commonly understood to mean originating from, 
growing out of, or flowing from, and require only that there be some causal relationship 
between the injury and the risk [provided for]." Id. (quoting with approval National Farmers 
Union Property <& Cas. Co. v. Western Cas. <& Sur. Co., 577 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1978)) 
(alteration in original). Based on this Court's precedent, if the injuries a plaintiff alleges to 
have suffered originated from, grew out of, or flowed from the infliction of emotional or 
mental anguish, the claim against a governmental entity is barred because immunity from 
liability has not been waived. See id. Moreover, the infliction of emotional anguish need not 
be the sole cause of the injury, only that it bear some causal relationship to the injury. See id. 
Under the Immunity Act, a court is required to look to the conduct that the claim 
arises out of to determine whether there is a waiver of immunity. This Court has rejected 
"claims that have reflected attempts to evade the statutory categories by recharacterization of 
the supposed cause of the injury." See Ledfors v. Emery County Sch. Disk, 849 P.2d 1162,1166 
(Utah 1993). In Ledfors, the plaintiffs' son suffered a vicious beating by two students in a 
gym class which was left unsupervised. Id. at 1163. The plaintiffs' lawsuit asserted a battery 
claim against the two students, and a negligence claim against the school district, the principal 
and the physical education teacher. The Court found that immunity had been retained under 
the exception to the waiver and found that § 63-30-10(2) of the Act specifically provided that 
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suit is not allowed against a governmental entity if the underlying "injury . . . arises out o f an 
assault or battery. Id. The Court concluded that the injuries suffered by the plaintiffs' son 
arose out of a battery which specifically exempted the governmental entity from suit. See id. 
at 1166. The plaintiffs then argued that the alleged injuries arose from the failure to 
supervise rather than from the battery. See id. In answering this argument this Court stated: 
Again, our prior cases have looked to whether the injury asserted "arose out 
o f conduct or a situation specifically described in one of the subparts of 63-
30-10; if it did, then immunity is preserved. We have rejected claims that have 
reflected attempts to evade these statutory categories by recharacterizing the 
supposed cause of the injury. 
Id 
The court in Butler, Crockett <& Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Salt Lake County^ 2005 UT App 402 
(per curiam unpublished decision) reached a similar conclusion. There, the court dismissed a 
contract-based claim against a public entity on the grounds that the injury arose out of 
conduct for which governmental immunity is preserved. In Butler^ the plaintiff filed a breach 
of contract claim based on Salt Lake County's denial of a conditional use permit. The court 
concluded that the "complaint as a whole demonstrates that the underlying harm was the 
denial of the CUP," and it further noted that immunity has not been waived under the 
Immunity Act for denial of a permit or license pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(3). 
Id. at Tf 1. Thus, the court held that the contract claim was barred by the Immunity Act 
"[b]ecause the injury arose out of conduct or a situation specifically described in one of the 
subparts of Utah Code section 63-30-10, governmental immunity is preserved." Id. 
The foregoing cases establish that, regardless of how a claim is labeled or the theory 
of liability on which a plaintiff relies is framed, a court is required to look to the conduct that 
the claim arises out of to determine whether there is a waiver of immunity. Here, Cabaness 
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expressly claims that his injuries flowed from the infliction of mental anguish. In the general 
allegations of the Complaint, plaintiff unequivocally alleges: "Prior to January 2004, 
Plaintiffs mental condition had deteriorated to the point that he could no longer meet his 
job requirements, directly resulting from the mental and emotional abuse inflicted on 
Plaintiff by Defendants."17 (R. 5 at^f 17) (emphasis added). In his contract claim, Cabaness 
specifically alleges that appellees "wrongfully violated and breached the employment contract 
by . . . creating a hostile and abusive working environment for Plaintiff, which directly and 
proximately caused Plaintiffs injury and damage." (R. 7 at j^ 27). Similarly, Cabaness alleges 
that appellees breached the implied good faith covenant by engaging "in a practice of 
harassing, intimidating and abusing Plaintiff... to the point that it interfered with his work, 
caused severe emotional harm, and profound clinical depression . . . ." (R. 7 at }^ 28). 
Further, Cabaness admitted in his opposition to appellees' summary judgment motion 
that the alleged infliction of emotional anguish caused his injuries. (R. 2400-2401). Indeed, 
Cabaness' 106 page opposing memorandum was largely devoted to establishing the assertion 
that he suffered mental anguish based on Thomas' alleged harassment and abusive conduct,18 
as does his brief in this appeal. In short, Cabaness' own admissions, arguments, allegations, 
17In a section of the Complaint entitled "Facts Common To All Claims For Relief." 
Cabaness alleges that Thomas "engaged in a practice of harassing, intimidating and abusing 
Plaintiff to the point that said practice interfered with his work, caused severe emotional 
harm and profound clinical depression". (R. 4 at f^ 14). 
18Cabaness references affidavits from certain of his medical care providers, who opine 
that his "depression and panic disorders . . . were caused, in substantial part, by the hostile 
work environment and an abusive boss while Cabaness was employed as a lineman at 
Bountiful Power." See, e.g., Affidavit of Jerry L. Sanders, Ph.D. (R. 2059 at \ 6). All of these 
affidavits are further proof that it is Cabaness' position that the underlying harm to all his 
claims is the infliction of mental anguish. 
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pleadings and court filings establish that his contract claims arise out of the alleged infliction 
of mental anguish. Thus, they are barred by the Immunity Act. 
C. DAMAGES FOR MENTAL DISTRESS ARE NOT RECOVERABLE 
UNDER CABANESS' CONTRACT CLAIMS. 
Even assuming Cabaness has a valid contract claim that is not barred by the 
Immunity Act, he cannot recover damages for emotional distress and mental suffering on his 
contract claims. It is a basic principle of contract law that a party cannot recover damages 
for mental suffering caused by a breach of contract. See Samuel Williston, 24 Williston on 
Contracts § 64:7 (4th ed. 1990); see also Americans Disabled for Accessible Public Transp. v. SkyWest 
Airlines, Inc., 762 F.Supp. 320, 326 (D. Utah 1990) (with respect to damages for emotional 
and mental distress, the traditional rule is that there is no recovery of damages for mental 
anguish stemming from a breach of contract); Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1998) (a 
party cannot, in general, recover damages for mere disappointment or mental distress in an 
action for the breach of a land sale contract). 
In his brief, Cabaness relies on cases dealing with insurance contracts to support his 
claim to recover mental anguish damages under his employment contract claims. In Machan 
v. UNUMLife Ins. Co. of America, 2005 UT 37, % 16, 116 P.3d 342, however, this Court 
considered the contractual obligations of an insurance company to its insureds and, at the 
outset of its opinion, was careful to state that it was addressing "insurance law questions". 
The decision also contains discussion of the '"unique nature and purpose of an insurance 
contract'". Id. ^ 9 (quoting Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 802 (Utah 1985)); ffij 
11-14, 17 (noting that what the insured bargains for in the context of an insurance contract is 
"peace of mind" and payment of the sum owed). Within the very narrow context of 
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insurance law, this Court states that in "unusual cases," a breach of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing in an insurance contract may encompass damages for mental anguish. 
Id. Tf 16 (emphasis added). 
Cabaness fails to cite any Utah precedent establishing that damages for mental distress 
are compensable under a breach of employment contract claim, or other instances not 
involving insurance law. Therefore, even if Cabaness' implied contract claims were viable, he 
cannot recover any mental distress damages under these claims. 
D. CABANESS' WRONGFUL CONSTRUCTIVE TERMINATION CLAIM 
FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Ignoring that his second claim for relief for wrongful constructive discharge was 
properly dismissed as a tort claim, Cabaness argues that this claim sounds in contract. 
Cabaness, however, cannot escape his express allegations to the contrary. Nowhere in the 
second claim for relief does the word "contract," or a derivative thereof, appear. Rather, 
Cabaness alleges that he was "wrongfully terminated" by reason of appellees' "abusive,. . . 
wrongful and outrageous conduct." (R. 8 at f^ 31 b., c. and d). He also alleges that he was 
"wrongfully constructively terminated" and that his damages and unemployable condition are 
a direct and proximate result of appellees' "wrongful and tortious conduct." (R. 8-9 at f^ 32-
34) (emphasis added). The phrase "wrongful and tortious conduct" appears three times in 
this claim. Finally, Cabaness seeks to recover punitive damages under this claim, which 
confirms that this claim sounds in tort. (R. 9 at f^ 35). 
As a tort claim, the second claim for relief necessarily fails as a matter of law. Utah 
only recognizes a tort claim for wrongful termination in the narrowly defined circumstance 
where a discharge "contravenes a clear and substantial public policy." Hansen v. America 
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Online, 2004 UT 62, ^ 7, 96 P.3d 950 (citing Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280, 1284 (Utah 
1992)).19 Such public policies are narrowly limited to those "clear" public policies that are 
plainly defined by legislative enactments, constitutional standards, or judicial decisions. See 
Hodges v. Gibson Prods. Co., 811 P.2d 151,165-66 (Utah 1991); Caldwell, 111 P.2d at 485. Here, 
Cabaness did not, and could not, show that he was terminated in violation of a "clear and 
substantial public policy." In fact, no public policy is identified in Cabaness' allegations by 
name or description. (R. 7-9 at fflf 30-35). 
Regardless, Cabaness' tort claim for wrongful termination is also expressly barred by 
the Immunity Act pursuant to Broad bent v. Board of E due. of Cache County Sch. Dist., 910 P. 2d 
1274,1276-77 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Despite the Complaint's express allegations to the contrary, Cabaness asserted for the 
first time during the summary judgment proceedings that this claim is a contract claim, not a 
tort claim. Cabaness was not allowed to change his legal theory for this claim long after the 
deadline for amending pleadings and conducting discovery has passed. Cabaness failed to 
offer any basis which would justify allowing him to morph his tort claim into a contract 
claim. Even if this claim was a contract claim, however, it is duplicative of his first claim for 
relief, {compare R. 7-9 at ffl[ 31-33 with R. 7 at ffif 27-28), and fails as a matter of law for the 
same reasons that his breach of implied contract claim fails, as discussed above. 
19In Peterson, this Court held that "the duty at issue in actions for wrongful termination 
in violation of public policy does not arise out of the employment contract. It is imposed by 
law, and thus is properly conceptualized as a tort." Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1285; see also 
Rutherford v. AT&T Comms., 844 P.2d 949, 966 n.9 (Utah 1992). 
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E. T H E INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
CLAIM AGAINST THOMAS AND MICHAELIS IS WITHOUT MERIT. 
1. Cabaness Cannot Rely On Evidence Of Incidents That Occurred When 
He Was Not Present, Nor On Incidents That Allegedly Occurred Prior 
To March 31, 2000. 
A large portion of Cabaness' brief is devoted to detailing alleged acts of abuse and 
harassment that occurred prior to 2000. All such incidents and conduct, however, are 
immaterial and irrelevant based on the applicable four-year statute of limitations. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-25 (1996). In Hatch v. Davis, 2004 UT App 378, 102 P.3d 774, the court 
explained that the four-year statute of limitations for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress claims begins to run when the distress is actually inflicted on the plaintiff. Id. at f^ 41. 
In circumstances such as this case, where Cabaness sought and received medical or 
psychiatric treatment as a result of alleged harassment, the statute of limitations begins to run 
on that date.20 See id. 
Here, Cabaness admitted and alleged that he "was diagnosed with depression caused 
by an abusive boss and a hostile working environment by Dr. David Warden MD on August 
4, 1997 . . . ." (EL 2351 at 1f 23). Thus, Cabaness had until August 4, 2001 to file a claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress based on any acts which occurred prior to Dr. 
Warden's diagnosis. Moreover, each subsequent act which allegedly inflicted emotional 
distress on Cabaness started the running of a four-year statute of limitations on that event. 
Since Cabaness did not serve his Notice of Claim until March 31, 2004, (R. 6 at f 20), he can 
only rely on incidents and conduct that occurred between the four-year period of March 31, 
20Only where "it is unclear when the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress, the 
statute of limitations begins to run from the time the last injury is suffered or the tortious 
conduct ceases." Hatch, 2004 UT App 378 at Tj 44. 
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2000 through March 31, 2004. Also, inasmuch as Cabaness fails to offer any dates for some 
of the alleged incidents of abuse, he cannot rely on those incidents because he did not 
establish that they occurred within the relevant four-year time period. 
Furthermore, a plaintiff asserting an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim 
cannot rely on conduct directed toward another person unless that plaintiff was present at 
the time of the outrageous conduct. See Hatch, 2004 UT App 378, ffif 50, 53. As discussed 
above, the record establishes that Cabaness was not present for many of the incidents he 
cites and, as a result, he cannot rely on them. Cabaness primarily relies on the July 30, 2003, 
jack-hammer incident to support his intentional infliction claim. Specifically, Cabaness 
alleges that, on this date, Thomas ordered City employees to jack-hammer a concrete block 
that encased plastic conduit containing "live" electrical conductors. See (R. 2019-2026). It is 
undisputed, however, that Cabaness was not present during the jack-hammer incident 
because he started a medical leave of absence on July 23, 2003, a week before this incident 
occurred, and he did not return to work until approximately six weeks later, September 8, 
2003. (R. 2052 at Tj 7). 
Cabaness argues that he is entitled to an exception to the "presence" rule articulated 
in Hatch v. Davis, 2006 UT 44, 147 P.3d 383, because it was his crew that was ordered to 
perform the unsafe work. In Hatch, however, this Court identified four factors which should 
be considered in determining whether an exception to the presence rule should be allowed: 
In considering whether conduct triggers the exception, a finder of fact may 
consider (1) the relationship of the target of the conduct to the plaintiff, (2) the 
relationship between the person committing the conduct and the plaintiff, and 
(3) the egregiousness of the conduct. Finally, (4) a plaintiff must establish that 
the conduct was undertaken, in whole or in part, with the intention of 
inflicting injury to the absent plaintiff. 
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Id. at Tj 27. With respect to the first element, this exception is typically limited to a family 
relationship, which does not, of course, exist here. More importantly, Cabaness has failed to 
come forward with any evidence to satisfy the fourth factor identified in Hatch, other than his 
bald assertion, without any basis or citation to the record, that Thomas ordered the 
employees to engage in this act as a way of tormenting, or getting at, Cabaness. It is 
significant to note that Courts have been reluctant to recognize exceptions to the "presence" 
rule and that the few exceptions which have been allowed have generally been limited to 
incidents of sexual abuse involving a family member.21 Thus, the jack-hammer incident, and 
any other incidents where Cabaness was not present, should not be considered in 
determining whether Thomas' actions were extreme and outrageous. 
2. Dr. Hawk's Untimely Report And Affidavit Were Properly Excluded. 
To support his intentional infliction claim, Cabaness relies heavily on the Hawks 
Affidavit and Report. The trial court, however, properly excluded them. Cabaness first 
attempted to submit the Hawks Report on July 19, 2006, approximately one week before the 
first hearing on the summary judgment motions, which was several months after the briefing 
21
 See, e.g., KD. v. W.H., 875 P.2d 26, 33-34 (Wyo. 1994) (noting exception to presence 
requirement where defendant sexually abused plaintiffs wife for several years and indirectly 
helped her commit suicide); Croft by Croft v. Wicker, 131 P.2d 789, 792-93 (Alaska 1987) 
(allowing recovery where houseguest molested plaintiffs' daughter although plaintiffs did not 
witness actual incident); Schurk v. Christensen, 497 P.2d 937, 940-41 (Wash. 1972) (relaxing the 
presence requirement for plaintiffs whose child was molested by baby-sitter); but see H.L.O. v. 
Hossle, 381 N.W.2d 641, 644-645 (Iowa 1986) (parents not present at the time of the 
defendant's tortious acts may not recover for emotional distress caused by neighbor's sexual 
abuse of their children); Miller v. Cook, 273 N.W.2d 567 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (plaintiff not 
present when child was beaten may not recover); Calliari v. Sugar, 435 A.2d 139 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Ch. Div. 1980) (purchasers of real property may not recover for emotional distress 
resulting from discovery of body of vendor's wife buried in back yard); Ljund v. Caple, 675 
P.2d 226 (Wash. 1984) (husband not present when defendant had sexual relations with wife 
may not recover). 
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on these motions was completed. After considering the matter, the trial court ruled on July 
26, 2006 that the Hawks Report would not be admitted or considered in ruling on the 
summary judgment motions. 
Several months later, when Cabaness filed his Rule 59 Motion, he filed a 46 page 
supporting memorandum and the McComas Affidavit, to which the Hawks Affidavit and 
Report were attached as Exhibits L and M. Later, Cabaness voluntarily withdrew both the 
memorandum and the McComas Affidavit based on a stipulation of the parties. (R. 3994). 
In their place, Cabaness filed a much shorter memorandum, and the Hilton Affidavit. The 
Hawks Affidavit and Report were, however, not refiled or resubmitted with either the Hilton 
Affidavit or the amended memorandum. Therefore, appellees' submit that the Hawks 
Affidavit and Report were not properly before the trial court. 
When Cabaness subsequendy tried to rely on the Hawks Affidavit and Report in 
support of the Rule 59 Motion, appellees objected. Cabaness subsequently moved to strike 
appellees' objection. The trial court, however, properly concluded that the Hawks Affidavit 
and Report were untimely and did not constitute "new evidence" under the legal standard 
discussed above. Cabaness simply did not satisfy the "surprise" or the "due diligence" 
requirements for establishing that the Hawks Affidavit and Report constitute "new evidence" 
where he had the Hawks Report for months (as shown by the date of the Report) and he had 
failed to timely file it at the summary judgment stage of this case. 
3. The Relevant Actions Of Thomas Or Michaelis Do Not Give Rise To A 
Claim For Intentional Infliction Of Emotional Distress. 
Utah recognizes a cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress 
when a defendant: 
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intentionally engage[s] in some conduct toward [s] the plaintiff, (a) with the 
purpose of inflicting emotional distress, or, (b) where any reasonable person 
would have known that such would result; and his actions are of such a nature 
as to be considered outrageous and intolerable in that they offend against the 
generally accepted standards of decency and morality. 
Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook <&McDonough, 2003 UT 9, \ 58, 70 P.3d 17, 30 (emphasis 
added); see also Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, If 57, 116 P.3d 323; Larson v. SYSCO 
Corp,, 767 P.2d 557, 561 (Utah 1989).22 To determine whether the alleged conduct rises to 
the level of outrageousness required under Utah law to support a claim for severe emotional 
distress, Utah courts rely on the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46, comment d (1965), which 
states that liability should be found: 
Only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme 
in decree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and to be regarded 
as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the 
case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the 
community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to 
exclaim, MOutrageous!" 
Id. In addition, to be considered outrageous, the conduct must evoke outrage or revulsion; it 
must be more than unreasonable, unkind, or unfair. See Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of 
Tatter-Day Saints, 2001 UT 25, j^ 28, 21 P.3d 198. Conduct is not necessarily outrageous 
merely because it is tortious, injurious, or malicious, or because it would give rise to punitive 
damages, or because it is illegal. See id. Finally, liability for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty 
oppressions, or other trivialities. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46, comment d (1965). 
Indeed, as one court has noted, 
22The intentional infliction claim must be based on conduct that Thomas and/or 
Michaelis engaged in "towards Cabaness." Thus, the allegations that Thomas abused or 
harassed others are largely irrelevant, particularly if Cabaness was not present 
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The rough edges of our society are still in need of. . . filing down, and in the 
meantime plaintiffs must necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a 
certain amount of rough language, and to occasional acts that are definitely 
inconsiderate and unkind. There is no occasion for the law to intervene in every case 
where someone's feelings are hurt. 
Kornegay v. Mundy, 379 S.E.2d 14,16 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). Thus, "ongoing frustration in the 
work place, born of a personality conflict with a co-employee does not give rise to" an 
intentional infliction claim, and such conflicts "should not be litigated in court." Id. 
Based on the legal standard, the trial court correcdy concluded that Thomas and 
Michaelis did not engage in conduct "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, 
as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly 
intolerable in a civili2ed community." Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46, comment d (1965). 
Indeed, the alleged harassing actions, at most, fall within the list of conduct which the 
Restatement states is insufficient to support a claim, i.e., "mere insults, indignities, threats, 
annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities." IdP 
In his brief, Cabaness attempts to paint a picture of constant abuse and harassment 
against a backdrop of dangerous and life-threatening working conditions. He does this by 
relying on inadmissible evidence, referring to immaterial and irrelevant conduct, compressing 
events that took place over decades, and overstating the facts. For example, to support his 
characteri2ation of Thomas unnecessarily risking the lives of employees, Cabaness points to: 
(1) the July 23, 2003 jack-hammer incident where Cabaness was not present; (2) an incident 
in 1983, when Thomas allegedly told Cabaness there was not time to ground a pole, and 
Cabaness received a painful shock; and (3) an incident where Thomas ordered another 
23This is particularly true when one considers all the other sources of stress in 
Cabaness5 life during the relevant four-year period. See footnote 8, above. 
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employee to pull a loaded fuse, and then pulled it himself without proper safety equipment, 
whereupon the fuse exploded. 
None of these incidents, however, are relevant, and Cabaness has overstated the facts 
in describing them, and, as a result, they should not be considered by the Court. Cabaness 
was not present for the jack-hammer incident and the Court should not consider it for the 
reasons discussed above. The ungrounded pole incident occurred at least twenty years 
before Cabaness resigned, Cabaness never testified that he received a shock or that he knew 
he could have been killed, and he further testified that he was already up the pole when he 
told Thomas he needed to put a ground on the wire. (R. 2132 at 81:14-82:3). Finally, 
regarding the exploding fuse incident, Cabaness was not in the immediate vicinity when the 
fuse exploded, his testimony of what happened is based on inadmissible hearsay, and the 
incident occurred in the mid-1990s, which is outside the relevant four-year period. (R. 
2131-2132 at 80:23-81:4; R. 2131at 79:14-15). Further, Cabaness did not testify that the crew 
"lacked the right safety equipment"; rather, he testified that the switch they were working on 
didn't have safety devices on it because it was an old piece of equipment. (R. 2131 at 80:5-6). 
A careful analysis of the relevant facts demonstrates that Cabaness' version of the facts in his 
brief, is not reliable and is filled with inaccuracies. 
In addition to the jack-hammer incident discussed above, Cabaness also relies heavily 
on the September 9, 2003 employee meeting as a basis for his claim. The only evidence of 
this incident is found in the Knighton Affidavit. Significantly, Cabaness himself did not 
mention it in either his deposition or his Affidavit, which causes one to wonder how 
traumatic the incident could have been. Specifically, Cabaness asserts that, on September 9, 
2003, the day after he returned to work from his medical leave, he attended an employee 
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meeting wherein, according to Knighton, Thomas "belittled and berated [plaintiff] and told 
him, in the presence of all of the employees, that he was considering firing him. He also 
brought up some personal matters involving [Cabaness] and ridiculed him in the presence of 
the other employees." (R. 2215 at f^ 19). Knighton also said that he found Thomas' 
behavior to be "unforgivable." Id. 
The trial court correcdy concluded that the majority of the allegations made by 
Knighton are conclusory and insufficient to support a finding that Thomas engaged in the 
requisite extreme and outrageous conduct: necessary to constitute an intentional infliction 
claim. Pursuant to the Knighton Affidavit, the only specific thing Thomas said during the 
September 9th meeting was that he was "considering firing" Cabaness. Such a statement falls 
squarely within the type of conduct which does not support a claim. See Boisjoly v. Morton 
Thiokoly Inc., 706 F. Supp. 795, 802 (D. Utah 1988) (where threatening to terminate an 
employee, discrediting his reputation, and demoting him failed to support a claim). Other 
than this statement, all Knighton offers is his conclusory characterization of what Thomas 
said-belittling, berating, bringing up personal matters, ridiculing. These allegations cannot 
support a claim because Knighton fails to disclose exactly what was said, which prevents any 
evaluation of the statements themselves. Knighton fails to identify any personal matters 
discussed by Thomas, or any statements Thomas made that he thought belittled Cabaness. 
Accordingly, as the trial correctly ruled, these assertions in the Knighton Affidavit fail to 
satisfy the standard of what constitutes admissible statements from an affiant, based on the 
legal standard and case law discussed above, in footnote 5. 
In short, when one sorts through the actual facts, focusing on those events that are 
not barred by the four-year statute of limitations, and considers the admissible evidence, even 
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granting all reasonable inferences in favor of Cabaness, the evidence (which the trial court 
summari2ed in its Memorandum Decision (R. 3641-3642)) it reveals that neither Thomas nor 
Michaelis engaged in conduct that meets the threshold level of extreme and outrageous 
conduct necessary to give rise to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
Certainly, there is no basis for such a claim against Michaelis, who never engaged in any 
harassing conduct himself, and is only accused of failing to stop Thomas. Appellees refer the 
Court to its Response to f^ 7 of Cabaness fact statement, above. The events detailed there, 
whether considered individually or cumulatively, at most constitute the type of personality 
conflicts, threats, indignities, insults, petty oppressions and annoyances which do not give 
rise to intentional infliction claim. Indeed, appellees submit that, even if the Court were to 
consider cumulatively all the incidents which Cabaness alleges occurred over the last twenty 
years, Cabaness still has failed to present sufficient evidence to establish a intentional 
infliction of emotional distress claim against Thomas or Michaelis. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the City respectfully submits that the trial court's dismissal of 
Cabaness' claims should be affirmed. 
DATED this 21st day of January, 2009. 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
PER CURIAM. 
*1 Butler, Crockett and Walsh Development Cor-
poration (Butler) appeals the trial court's dismissal 
of its complaint. 
Butler filed its complaint against Salt Lake County 
(the County) in 2000, after the County denied But-
ler's application for a conditional use permit (CUP). 
The complaint alleged six causes of action, seeking 
monetary damages and the granting of the CUP. 
The trial court dismissed the first three causes of 
action in January 2003, determining that the claims 
were barred by governmental immunity under the 
Governmental Immunity Act. SeeUtah Code Ann. 
§§ 63-30-1 to -38 (1997).fNl The trial court dis-
missed the remaining claims in December 2004 
based on failure to prosecute. 
FN1. This chapter was repealed effective 
July 1, 2004, and a new governmental im-
munity act was enacted. SeeUiah Code 
Ann. §§ 63-30d-l01 to -904 (2004). The 
former Act controls this case. 
Butler asserts the trial court committed reversible 
error in its January 2003 order when it dismissed 
claims for failure to file a notice of claim and fail-
ure to file an undertaking. See id. § 63-30-12 
(providing for notice of claim); § 63-30-19 
(requiring an undertaking to be filed at the time a 
complaint is filed). However, the trial court did not 
dismiss the claims on those grounds. In its order, 
the trial court noted that Butler had complied with 
the notice requirements and that Butler had filed an 
undertaking, although untimely. The trial court then 
dismissed the claims based solely on governmental 
immunity. In sum, Butler's asserted error does not 
directly address the trial court's decision. 
Butler does not show that the trial court erred in 
concluding that governmental immunity applied. In 
determining whether immunity applies, Utah courts 
have "looked to whether the injury asserted 'arose 
out of conduct or a situation specifically described 
in one of the subparts of 63-30-10; if it did, then 
immunity is preserved." Ledfots v. Ewety County 
Sch. Disr.. 849 P.2d 1162, 1166 (Utah 1993). 
Courts will reject claims that reflect "attempts to 
evade these statutory categories by recharacterizing 
the supposed cause of the injury."W. The theory of 
liability crafted by a plaintiff does not control. See id. 
Although couched as a contract-based declaratory 
action, the substance of the complaint seeks affirm-
ative relief, not just the declaration of rights under a 
contract. The breach cause of action demands that 
the trial court grant the CUP and damages. It does 
not request the trial court to enforce the contract 
through specific performance or declare the stand-
ard to which Butler is entitled under the contract. 
The additional causes of action in the complaint, al-
© 2009 Thomson ReutersAVest. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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though supposedly based on the same contract, go 
further afield from contract relief. One seeks a re-
view and reversal of the County's decision; the oth-
ers assert violations of due process and civil rights 
rather than contract-based actions. The complaint as 
a whole demonstrates that the underlying harm was 
the denial of the CUP. 
Because the injury asserted arose out of conduct or 
a situation specifically described in one of the sub-
parts of Utah Code section 63-30-10, governmental 
immunity is preserved. SeeUtah Code Ann. § 
63-30-10. Section 63-30-10(3) expressly retains im-
munity for any injury that "arises out of, in connec-
tion with, or results from ... the issuance, denial, 
suspension, or revocation or by the failure or refus-
al to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, li-
cense, certificate, approval, order, or similar au-
thorization."/*/. § 63-30-10(3). The denial of a CUP 
comes within the scope of this section, retaining 
immunity for claims arising from the denial of a 
permit. See id. As a result, the trial court properly 
dismissed the causes of action based on govern-
mental immunity. 
*2 The remaining causes of action were dismissed 
in December 2004 for failure to prosecute. Butler 
does not challenge that dismissal, but attempts to 
reach back to challenge prior rulings. However, be-
cause the prior rulings did not provide the grounds 
for the actual final dismissal, Butler's arguments are 
not on point. Butler has not shown that the trial 
court erred in dismissing the remaining claims for 
failure to prosecute. 
Accordingly, the dismissal of Butler's complaint is 
affirmed. 
Utah App.,2005. 
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